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Abstract—The use of data Grids for sharing relevant data has 
proven to be successful in many research disciplines. However, 
the use of these environments when personal data is involved 
(such in health) is reduced due to its lack of trust. There are many 
approaches that provide encrypted storages and key shares to 
prevent the access from unauthorized users. However, these 
approaches are additional layers which should be managed along 
with the authorization policies. We present in this paper a privacy 
enhancing technique that uses encryption and relates to the 
structure of the data and their organizations, providing a natural 
way to propagate authorization and also a framework that fits 
with many use cases. The article describes the architecture and 
processes and also shows results obtained in a medical imaging 
platform. 
 
Index Terms—Grid, Security, Ontologies, OGSA, WSRF 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Data security is a key requirement for biomedical Grid 
applications. Dealing with the different national legal 
regulations and procedures accepted by the medical 
community [1] requires a carefully approach. 
One of the challenges for biomedical application is to 
provide efficient high-level interfaces depending on the 
applications that enable access to Grids for non-experts, 
ensuring transparent access to medical resources through 
services compatible with medical practice. As part of the 
interfaces, a flexible architecture for the management of the 
privacy of data is needed, compatible with medical practice 
and with pre-existing medical information systems. 
Besides, the talks which were delivered by the authors of the 
“Grids: The Top Ten Questions” give us one concluding 
remark that describes many of the Grid production platforms 
today: Until security is made easier to use, it will not be used 
[2]. Grid security systems are complex enough to be 
considered an obstacle in the successful Grid adoption. The 
proposed architecture introduces new concepts and methods 
that need to be expressed in the natural terms of the 
application community or it will be considered a new barrier. 
A Virtual Organization [3] (VO) is formed from different 
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real entities (e.g. Medical Centers, Hospitals, Governmental 
Centres), and probably also from different communities (e.g. 
physicians and researchers working in specific projects). 
Access to data is normally organised around VO membership. 
Medical Imaging Grid middlewares using virtual 
communities for sharing, transferring and processing DICOM 
medical images in a distributed environment [4] are starting to 
be adopted by the medical community. The Digital Imaging 
and Communications in Medicine [5] (DICOM) is the most 
common standard for medical images. A single DICOM file 
contains both a header (which stores information about the 
patient's name, the type of scan, image dimensions, structure 
report etc), as well as all of the image data (which can contain 
information in three dimensions) or structured reports in 
DICOM Structured Reporting Objects [6] (DICOM-SR). 
TRENCADIS, is a middleware for managing DICOM 
Structured Reporting Objects [6] that has been used as part of 
the CVIMO [7] deployment, in which five hospitals in 
Valencian Region collaborate to share DICOM Studies and 
DICOM Structured Reports. Three ontologies have been 
created in CVIMO which define the three oncological target 
areas implied (i.e. lung, liver and central nervous system). 
Each area can only access the parts of DICOM studies defined 
in the ontology that a user belongs to. 
The main objective of this paper is to provide Grid 
middlewares such as TRENCADIS, with efficient and reliable 
privacy protection for sensitive data. This paper presents a 
model for long-term storage and management of encrypted 
data in distributed environments. Furthermore, the paper 
outlines how this model is implemented to preserve the privacy 
of patient information in Grid-based collaborative 
computational infrastructures for biomedical applications. 
This paper delineates a dependable security framework in 
overextended organizations. Throughout the assembly of this 
framework, organizations will encounter different degrees of 
data integrity and confidentiality. 
The specific objectives of the paper are: 
• To propose an on-the-fly cryptographic infrastructure to 
protect privacy from users with administrative privileges. 
• To provide a flexible architecture for organizing key 
management for long-term storage of encrypted data. 
• To propose a model applicable in different environments, 
compatible with current Grid middlewares. 
• To provide an access control mechanism for encryption 
keys based on ontological groups and roles. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II illustrates 
related works. Section III describes the Security Model and an 
insight into the security issues presented in previous papers 
[34][35]. Section IV shows a real deployment of the security 
model that has been applied in the CVIMO project. After that, 
results about the model deployed in a controlled environment 
are described. Finally conclusions are presented. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Computational Grids offer a number of benefits and 
opportunities to biomedicine, healthcare and other biomedical 
domain areas [8]. Several recent systems, focused on new 
Health-related applications are analysed. 
The Medical Data Manager (MDM) [9] is a data 
management service designed to handle medical images on 
Grids, strongly based to the gLite middleware. The MDM aims 
at guaranteeing patient’s privacy by keeping private data in 
acquisition centres. However, this approach comes along with 
higher complexity in the specification and maintenance of the 
access policies. Granting full access right to information 
objects (both image data and header attributes from a DICOM 
file), requires achieving a number of capabilities kept by 
different services in the form of access control lists (ACL). 
This approach has deficiencies in systems where the potential 
users will not be known beforehand. The higher flexibility of 
attribute-based approaches enables the model presented in this 
paper to deal efficiently with these requirements. 
The EncFile [10] is an encrypted file management system 
for biomedical applications in the EGEE [11] project. 
Although EncFile is not linked to the EGEE Grid components, 
the system has been implemented over LCG2 [12]. 
A Grid-based architecture for computer aided diagnosis, 
was presented in [13]. In order to protect information against 
unauthorized disclosure, the authors propose an encrypted 
storage component described in [14]. Although the prototype 
was validated on a large experimental platform, the 
architecture has not been tested in real environments. 
The Secure Storage Service provides a set of tools to 
manage confidential information in an encrypted format in a 
Grid Computing environment [15]. This service has been 
developed for the gLite [16] middleware. The Secure Storage 
Service aims to solve the insider abuse problem preventing 
also the administrators of the storage elements to access the 
confidential data in a clear format; however it does not specify 
a means to protect the decryption keys from being accessed by 
administrators. Moreover, the Secure Storage Service 
associates an ACL with the decryption key. This ACL contains 
all users authorized to access the encrypted file. This approach 
does not scale well as the number of users increases. 
Identifying data resources is a fundamental problem within 
large-scale Grid environments. While traditional solutions 
enable users from one organization to access data belonging to 
other organizations by sharing metadata, this may not be 
acceptable for certain organizations due to privacy concerns. 
The MDM client library provides APIs for requesting files 
based on the metadata attached to the DICOM image. The 
metadata is internally extracted from the DICOM headers and 
placed into specialized catalogues. 
The role of ontologies [17] in the context of Grid computing 
for obtaining, comparing and analyzing data is increasing. 
Ontologies can be used to localize data sets within 
collaborative environments, and to build on the fly collections 
of data files based on attributes of the ontology. 
Our proposal uses ontologies that define the information 
which is interesting for a given area or group [4]. In CVIMO, 
ontology attributes match DICOM fields (headers or DICOM-
SR tags) and can be used for filtering, indexing and searching 
DICOM objects in virtual collections. 
There are number of efforts to produce access control 
languages and standards based on XML (e.g. XACML [18]) 
and authorization assertion protocols (e.g. SAML [19]). While 
SAML provides a mechanism for making authentication and 
authorization assertions and a mechanism for conveying them, 
XACML provides the language that defines the rules needed to 
make the necessary authorization decisions. 
XACML has been applied with great success [20] for 
implementations of the Attribute-Based Access Control 
(ABAC) model. In ABAC, access decisions are based on 
attributes of the requestor and resource, and users need not be 
known by the resource before sending a request. ABAC is 
scalable and flexible and thus is more suitable for distributed, 
open systems, than identity-based access control models [21]. 
Finally, there are promising results on applying Semantic 
Web standards for protecting Grid [22] and web services [23].  
III. SECURITY MODEL 
A. Grid Architecture 
Most of the current Grid middlewares are based on Web 
Services protocols. The Open Grid Services Architecture [24] 
(OGSA) is a specification in progress that aims at defining a 
standard and open architecture for Grid-based applications. 
The Globus Toolkit is a realization of OGSA, which can be 
used to develop Grid applications. Globus Toolkit Version 4 
(GT4) provides services implemented on top of the Web 
Service Resource Framework [25] (WSRF), a specification 
that extends Web Services with stateful services and other 
features. The services of the architecture presented in this 
paper are all based in OGSA/WSRF. 
B. Grid Security Infrastructure  
The security services of Grids are not altogether different 
from those of other distributed system paradigms. Specifically, 
an effective security model must ensure a set of security 
primitives: identity verification, authorization, access control, 
data integrity, data confidentiality and availability.  
Modern Grid middlewares provide with the security 
infrastructure, usually by means of the Globus Security 
Infrastructure [26] (GSI), which is a set of tools, libraries and 
protocols used in Globus to securely access resources. Almost 
all Grid components and Grid middlewares use the GSI for 
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authentication. GSI also provides mechanisms that deal with 
secure connections as well as message protection. 
GSI lacks from guaranteeing the reliability of the 
information stored, in terms of authenticity and confidentiality.  
On the other hand, in computational Grids, authorization has 
an importance beyond its common security meaning. Proper 
Grid authorization eases the administration of the shared 
resources and provides coherence to the system by consistently 
preserving the relationships of the participants. 
Grid authorization is closely related to the Virtual 
Organization (VO) concept. The VO administrators define 
hierarchy relationships (e.g. groups, subgroups) in the VO, 
different privileges (e.g. roles, capabilities) to resources, and 
define membership in the groups. They are also in charge of 
controlling access to the Resources Providers (RPs) (e.g. 
services in an OGSA approach) on the basis of users’ 
credentials (e.g. groups, roles, capabilities) and the agreements 
established between the VO participants. In addition, the RPs 
have their own local security policies that may override the 
VO policies. Last decisions on the access to resources must be 
on the side of the owner of the resource, but global policies 
enable the management of large-scale infrastructures. 
In conclusion, the access control to the RPs in the 
collaborative Grid infrastructure is based on the membership 
in the group. The actions that users in a given group are 
allowed to perform (from the point of view of the VO) on a 
specific resource instance are determined by two policies: the 
rules that describe the group, and the rules controlling the 
access to resources. All this is managed in the RPs by a 
component named GateKeeper, which takes into account 
resource-specific policies, normally ACLs. 
The classic approach of ACLs requires that permissions are 
explicitly given to individuals or groups. If a piece of 
information should be made available to different VOs or VO 
groups (but not all of them), the data owner should explicitly 
indicate it when sharing the data. This could be complex if 
many data are created regularly. However, the metadata 
associated to a piece of information can have enough 
information to decide which groups should access it. 
There are several attribute-based access control systems for 
Grid environments in the literature (i.e. Akenti [27] , PERMIS 
[28], Shibboleth [29], and VOMS [30]). Group-based 
authorisation tools (such as VOMS) enable granting different 
roles and permissions for a single user. VOMS manages 
authorization information about the members of virtual 
organizations, and supplies this information as a X.509 
attribute certificate. In the context of the EGEE [11] Grid 
infrastructure, roles are assigned to users through VOMS. 
As VOMS makes use of X.509 attribute certificates to assert 
user’s group memberships, roles and capabilities, users must 
create a X.509 proxy certificate [31] before accessing the 
resources. A VOMS server generates the attribute extensions. 
C. VO Management and Ontologies 
The concept of ontology, as “the branch of metaphysics that 
deals with the nature of being” has been used in many areas of 
science and literature. In information technologies, an 
ontology is a vocabulary and a set of terms, rules and relations 
that define with the needed accuracy a set of entities enabling 
the definition of classes, hierarchies and other relations among 
them. The ontologies define the terms to be used to describe 
and represent a knowledge domain. In this sense, the 
ontologies organise the knowledge in a reusable way. 
An Ontology Server is a service provided by the model that 
defines the ontologies (in any language: XML, RDF, OWL, 
etc.) and specifies the relations between VO groups and 
ontologies. The Ontology Server stores a unique identifier for 
the ontologies in the context of the VO (namely Ontology Id). 
In conclusion, the VOMS server organizes the users into 
groups, and the Ontology Server organizes the access of 
groups to ontologically classified resources and data. Each 
group can manage multiple ontologies, and each ontology can 
be managed by different groups. 
D. Information Object Storage 
The Information Object Storage (IOS) is a repository 
service provided by the model. This repository stores all the 
encrypted information objects required by the VO, despite of 
the ontological classifications these object can have. 
Furthermore, the IOS keeps the relationships between the 
objects and the ontologies through the Encrypted Object 
Unique Identifier (EOUID) which uniquely identifies the 
object in the Grid. In parallel, the ontologies are used for 
filtering, indexing and searching encrypted objects in virtual 
collections. These virtual collections are also kept in the IOS. 
When a user tries to retrieve an information object, the 
Gatekeeper at the IOS verifies, first that the user’s credentials 
identify the user as a member of a VO group, secondly that 
this group is authorized on the object’s ontologies (combining 
the ontology information stored in the Ontology Server), and 




Fig. 1.  Access control relation among Ontologies - VO groups – Information 
Objects Storage. 
 
Figure 1 shows 3 ontologies that classify the objects into 
three subsets (Onto1, Onto2, and Onto3). Users are organized 
into two groups (Group1, Group2), and there is one user in 
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both groups. Group1 is authorized to access data from 
ontology 1 and 2 (what means accessing objects s2, s3, s4 and 
s5). Group 2 can access data from ontology 2 and 3 (what 
means accessing objects s1, s2, s4 and s6). User 2 will be 
authorized to access data from Onto1 and Onto2, or Onto2 and 
Onto3, depending on the credentials exposed.  
Moreover, an IOS might allow or deny the access from 
users of specific group (IOS 1 and Group 1 in the figure 1).  
For this reason, User1, even able to manage objects from 
ontology 1, cannot access s2 and s3 data in IOS 1.  
The key of the authorisation mechanism is that ontologies 
and VO groups can only be created by the system 
administrator, which needs the agreement from the deputies of 
the communities to include an ontology from one group in a 
different group. Finally, individual users or VO groups can be 
banned even presenting the right ontologies through a 
configuration file of the gatekeeper. This is a critical operation 
and should be performed at the resource administration level. 
E. Encryption and Decryption of Data 
The model requires a symmetric cryptographic key to 
encrypt and decrypt the information object. 256-bit keys AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) [32] are used. Submitters of 
new/updated datasets utilize separate keys for each object. 
Encryption and decryption operations took place on the client, 
preventing overload of application servers running the IOS. 
Given that the risk of attacks is higher in servers which 
share multiple services (including public ones) and the impact 
could be higher since server keep far more data than clients, 
keeping unencrypted information out of the IOS not only 
improves performance, but also helps to protect the 
information from unauthorized disclosure. 
F. Data Integrity and Confidentiality 
Dependable data storage and sharing among multiple 
organizations are important features of the proposed model. 
The security framework guards data integrity and 
confidentiality, while ensuring that information objects are 
easily accessible for authorized users. 
An integrity code protects both object’s integrity as well as 
its authenticity by allowing users to detect any changes to the 
object content. We implement this functionality through a 160-
bit RIPEMD message digest algorithm. The AES-encrypted 
blocks of data are used as input for the digest function, joining 
the encryption/decryption and validation in a single step. 
The encrypted objects are stored in the IOS, while 
redundant copies of the integrity code are kept in secure 
storages, ensuring that authorized users can compare the 
integrity code with the digest of the encrypted object. 
A message integrity code provides integrity. Additional 
measures for authenticity are explained in next section, as well 
as the reason for not encrypting the integrity code. 
 On the other hand, guaranteeing confidentiality of sensitive 
data outside the organization’s borders additionally requires 
implementing a decryption key management scheme. 
In our model, the management of decryption keys is 
performed through a secret sharing scheme. The key 
distribution is achieved by a client that divides the key in N 
different shares using the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [33]. 
Key shares are distributed among different administrative 
domains that contribute with the responsibility of protecting 
data from unauthorized disclosure. Only k shares (k < N) are 
needed to reconstruct a key. Key shares are pairs of data that 
relate to the input and output of a polynomial of degree N. A 
sharing pair is represented as (IDKeyPart, Key), where 
IDKeyPart and Key are the input and the output (to the 
polynomial), respectively. Key shares for the same decryption 
key must be placed at different Key Servers. 
The Key Server is a repository service provided by the 
model. Two Key Servers are different if and only if they are 
located at different administrative domains. This means that 
they are managed by different administrators, even if they are 
sharing the same VO. It also means that any user who has 
granted access to a share in a given administrative domain 
cannot reconstruct the decryption key without obtaining 
permission on other k-1 administrative domains. 
G. Distribution of the Key Shares and the Integrity Code 
Distribution of key shares is one of the novel contributions 
of this paper. By taking the participants of the secret sharing 
scheme in different administrative domains, the information is 
protected from being exposed by users granted with physical 
or administrator access, ensuring the confidentiality of the 
encrypted objects in the Grid. 
Each administrative domain need to be enclosed within the 
boundaries of one organization. The organization registered as 
a private data holder or as a private data processor, must carry 
on with a set of legal responsibilities concerning keeping 
private data secure from unauthorized access or disclosure. 
Key Servers not only store key sharing pairs, but also kept a 
copy of the integrity code of the encrypted object. The 
distribution of the integrity code among real administrative 
domains ensures the integrity of the objects in the Grid, and 
does not necessarily need to encrypt the integrity code to 
provide a reliable level of assurance. In this way, it becomes 
possible to validate the object integrity by comparing the 
integrity code with its representation in the Key Servers. 
Unauthorized attempts to modify any encrypted object on the 
Grid will require compromising the security of a group of 
services deployed by different administrative domains. 
Storing the integrity codes in the Key Servers also serves 
the purpose of providing the model with a reliable permission 
revocation mechanism. When a user is revoked from a given 
VO group, he or she will not be able to access the objects 
using the VO credentials. The problem arises when the user 
kept a decryption key after permission revocation and he or 
she could use local administrative privileges to access the data 
in the storage elements. In these scenarios, the authenticity and 
the integrity of the objects is ensured by cross validating the 
copy of the integrity code within the encrypted object with the 
copies stored in the Key Servers available at different 
administrative domains. The complexity of compromising the 
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integrity of an object is the problem of compromising at least k 
Key Servers located in k different administrative domains. 
Useful insight into the permission revocation issue was 
presented in a previous paper [34]. 
H. Administrative Domains in the VO 
The different administrative domains that kept shares of the 
same decryption key may be part of the same VO. The VO 
context is the perfect scope for the integration of independent 
organizations in data protection schemes. VOs are usually 
associated with a project related to a community where 
information objects are shared. The VO should agree on the 
values of k and N, as well as the number of Key Server replicas 
that each party should contribute to guarantee operation. 
Previous works [33] have probed that a very robust key 
management scheme can be reached by using N = 2k – 1. 
As the participants of the secret sharing scheme are in 
different administrative domains, even the minimum value the 
k parameter can take (k = 2) enhances the privacy of the data, 
since any user (even a local administrator of a storage) needs 
obtaining access on k different administrative domains in order 
to reconstruct a decryption key. On the other hand, with k = 2, 
only N = 3 different administrative domains are needed. In the 
context of the VO, the administrative domains could be 
defined as the individual organizations which control private 
information, and contribute with their private data to the VO. 
In our model, each administrative domain is revealed by an 
X.509 organizational unit attribute, along with the common 
name attribute of the certificate authority. 
I. Publication in Monitoring and Information System (MIS) 
The Monitoring and Information System (MIS) is a 
significant piece of Grid technology. This component could be 
implemented in many different ways (e.g. GMA, MDS2, 
MDS4) depending on the middleware used (gLite, GT2 and 
GT4), while the objective is the same: to collect and to deliver 
information about Grid resources where and when needed. 
MIS simplifies the key shares distribution process among 
parties involved in the secret sharing scheme. Administrative 
domains integrated in VOs issue information about their key 
servers to the MIS, and the clients query the MIS for available 
key servers in trusted and different administrative domains. 
The identification of a Key Server and its administrative 
domain requires The Key Server’s URI, the local Key Server 
identifier (IDKS) relative to the administrative domain, and the 
identifier of the administrative domain. This information is 
issued by the MIS and queried by the VO clients.  
The figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the storage 
and management of encrypted data in the Grid. The top of the 
figure shows a user interacting with the MIS of the VO. The 
user queries the MIS for three Key Servers in three different 
administrative domains. At the base of the figure 3, 
independent organizations affiliated with the VO are 
represented. Each organization contributes with its own Key 
Servers in the decryption key sharing scheme. At the top of the 
figure, a CA issues security credentials to the members of the 
VO. The Key Servers register the organizations in the MIS 
index. Through the structure of DNs, the administrative 
domains of the key Servers are revealed. These different 
administrative domains are used by the encryption mechanism 
to ensure that different key parts are stored on different 
domains (as shown at the top of the figure 2). The encrypted 
object is generated using a new encryption key and the 




Fig. 2.  Schematic representation of the storage and management of 
encrypted data. It shows the encryption of an information object and the 
distribution of the key shares among different administrative domains. 
 
Once the decryption key shares are distributed among the 
parties (additional attributes issued to the Key Servers will be 
explained in the following sections), the encrypted object is 
submitted to the IOS. Since the confidentiality and integrity of 
the information object is protected by the framework through 
the encryption and the integrity code, the IOS could be 
deployed across the whole of VO computing environment. 
J. Uniqueness of Information Objects  
Whether an encrypted information object could be moved to 
a different IOS (or simply, whether it could be replicated), 
depends on how complex is to modify the information linking 
the object with the IOS and with the Key Servers. 
The EOUID is a globally unique identifier that guarantees 
that the encrypted information objects can be unambiguously 
identified. The EOUID is assigned the first time the object is 
encrypted, and is based on the Universally Unique Identifier 
(UUID) standard to guarantee to be unique in time and space. 
Referring to an encrypted object by its EOUID, Grid 
repositories (i.e. IOS and Key Server) guarantees that the 
information derived from the object is detached from the 
physical location of the object in the Grid. 
K. Encrypted Objects’s Data Format  
Besides the encrypted bits, the encrypted object carries 
additional information. Along with the already mentioned 
integrity code, the encrypted object contains header fields, a 
body of encrypted bits and a footer field. The prime number 
used to divide the key is attached to the object in a header 
field. The rest of the header contains the N identifiers of the 
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administrative domains that keep shares of the decryption key. 
The footer field is reserved for the integrity code. 
L. Access Control with Ontology Attributes 
The basic idea of access control with ontology attributes is 
not to define permissions directly between users and resources, 
but instead to use the resources’ ontology attributes as the 
basis for authorization. Access control policies grant groups of 
users with different privileges to ontologically classified 
resources. All services in the framework must enforce these 
policies on users, and thereby they must know what services in 
the Grid store the authorization statements that Policy 
Decision Points (PDP) will use with the attributes available 
about the requester and the resource to evaluate authorization. 
The previous sections of this paper discussed where policies 
and other authorization attributes are stored in the framework: 
the VOMS Server is the repository where VO groups and roles 
are created and maintained, the Ontology Server stores the 
different authorization statements that define the relations 
between VO groups and ontologies, and the IOS defines the 
ontological classification of the information objects. 
As we seen before, the IOS could be deployed anywhere in 
the Grid. Therefore, an IOS outside the administrative domain 
is not a trusted source of ontology attributes for Key Servers. 
On the contrary, when the Key Server itself is a source of 
ontology attributes for its administrative domain, changing a 
encrypted object’s ontology in the IOS does not affect the 
security of the object. Keeping a list of ontologies for the 
object, the Key Server guarantees the security of the key, thus 
guaranteeing the security of the encrypted object. 
Besides the decryption key share, the IDKeyPart, the 
integrity code, and the EOUID, the object owner stores a list 
of ontology identifiers (Ids. Ontologies) for the encrypted 
object in the Key Server. Hereby, authorization to key shares 
is provided to predefined ontologies that are related to the 
encrypted object. In this way, ontology identifiers updates 
must be synchronized among Key Servers. Hence, this model 
works better for applications where ontological classification 
of encrypted objects varies little over time. 
M. Rebuilding Keys and Decrypting information 
When a Grid user wants to retrieve an encrypted object 
identified by its EOUID, the user is first authenticated, and 
then the IOS collects the attributes from the user’s proxy 
(figure 3, Step 1). It then consults the Ontology Server to find 
out if the user belongs to any of the VO groups allowed to 
access the ontologies related to the object. If authorized by the 
IOS, the user will retrieve the encrypted object (fig. 3, Step 2). 
Once the user retrieves the encrypted object, he or she 
extracts the administrative domain identifiers from the header 
of the encrypted object (fig. 3, Step 3). Then the user consults 
the MIS for the URIs of the Key Servers (see fig. 2), and 
consults k Key Servers to retrieve the key (fig. 3, Step 4). 
   
 
Fig. 3.  Schematic representation of the reconstruction of the decryption 
key and the decryption and validation of the encrypted object. 
 
The role of the different components of the model involved 
in the security scheme can be explained through an example in 
the terminology of the XACML standard: when a user requests 
to the Key Server to retrieve a key share, the code responsible 
for executing the request contains a Policy Enforcement Point 
(PEP) creating an access request. The access request contains 
the attributes that identify the user, and the encrypted object 
associated with the key share (ontologies), and the action 
being performed in the resource (retrieving a decryption key). 
The PEP sends this description of the attempted access to the 
Gatekeeper. The Gatekeeper implements a Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) that consults the Ontology Server for policies 
matching the specified group membership to the ontologies 
(figure 3, Step 5, 6), and also consulting local security policies 
(e.g. resource-specific ACLs). The PDP then evaluates the 
access request and issues an authorization decision, sending 
this conclusion to the PEP. Finally, the PEP executes the code 
for retrieving the key share, or throws a denying exception.  
If authorized, the user will retrieve k different shares and k 
copies of the integrity code (fig. 3, Step 7). 
With the k sharing pairs, the user reconstructs the decryption 
key, decrypts the object, and computes the integrity code 
(figure 3, steps 9 and 10). The user verifies the computed 
integrity code with the code stored within the encrypted object, 
and with the codes retrieved from the Key Servers. 
IV. REAL IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT 
Radiological image and report data storage and distribution 
in clinical practice at intra-corporative level is a well-solved 
issue with many industrial successful stories. However, sharing 
data for research and training is an issue that deals with 
additional problems, such as knowledge organisation, privacy 
and processing. A representative use case targeted by the 
present work could be executing a perfusion analysis on all the 
images from patients suffering a hepatocarcinome and 
retrieving the flow rate coefficient images. This cannot be 
done in current image management systems on clinical 
delivery, even involving only one institution or administrative 
domain. Integrating multiple sources will increase the 
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representativeness of the study, and the integration of 
computing resources will enable complex post-processing. 
The model presented in this paper has been implemented in 
the framework of the Valencian Cyberinfraestructure of 
Oncological Medical Images [7] (CVIMO) project. All 
services implemented are based on OGSA/WSRF, which 
constitutes the Grid architecture and infrastructure of the 
project. The implementation has been done using the Globus 
Toolkit 4, which uses MDS4 as MIS [35]. 
CVIMO is a project funded by the Ministry of Enterprises, 
University and Science of the Valencia Region. In this case, 
the ontologies are built from an anonymized set of attributes 
from DICOM headers or DICOM-SR fields. This set is 
controlled by the VO at a central level, and under the approval 
of the management of the system, so no privacy leakages 
appear. Relevant cases are organised into three communities 
related with oncology (lung, liver and central nervous system). 
CVIMO does not compete with intra-hospital System such as 
PACS or RIS/HIS systems, which are oriented to clinical daily 
practice, but complements them with a collaborative tool to 
store and share cases relevant for their research or training. 
A VO named CVIMO and three VO groups have been 
created using a VOMS Server, one for each oncological 
community implied. The studies relevant for each group can be 
defined through the ontology using a part of their information. 
These ontologies are defined in XML. When a user performs a 
query operation, he or she can only access the information of 
DICOM studies or DICOM structured reports specified by the 




Fig. 4.  Path from the creation a relevant DICOM-SR to the share it in the 
Grid. 
 
When a medical user selects a relevant DICOM Study for 
sharing (point 1, fig. 4), first creates the structured report 
DICOM-SR with a given diagnostic (point 2, fig. 4). DICOM 
Study and DICOM-SR are sent to the IOS to share the 
information only with the users of the community related to the 
study. If this happened, the object is encrypted (point 4, fig. 4) 
and then inserted into the IOS. The encryption operation 
implies consulting the ontologies’ identifiers that the user can 
manage (points 4.1 and 4.2, fig. 4), to generate an EOUID for 
the encrypted object (points 4.3 and 4.4, fig. 4) and to create 
and distribute the encryption key (point 4.3, fig. 4). 
The implemented services in this system are the following: 
• Ontology Server. Keep the ontologies and the relations 
between VO groups and ontologies. 
• Key Server. Keep for each key part the associated 
information (MIC – Message Integrity Code, EOUID and 
IDs of ontologies, IDKeyPart and the key part). 
• EOUID Server. This service generates the EOUIDs 
required to identify the encrypted objects. 
• DICOM Storage. This service storage the DICOM 
studies and DICOM-SR encrypted. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A sample dataset from radiology studies has been created. 
Each file in the dataset consists of radiology image 
accompanied by relevant (anonymous) clinical data. Four 
different studies with different file sizes (see Table I), were 
used to create the sample set.  
TABLE I. SAMPLE DATASET LOCATED IN AN INFORMATION OBJECT STORAGE 
IN THE VO. 
Id. Study Id. Image Id. Image Size (MB) 
A 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.4 1 0.5 
B 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.7 1 2.5 
C 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.1 1 5.8 
D 1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.3 1 7.7 
 
Images were firstly encrypted and stored in an IOS. 
Unencrypted images are also stored in the IOS, to measure the 
differences between encrypted and unencrypted objects. The 
length of registering and retrieving an object in the IOS was 
measured in a client of the infrastructure. Figure 5 shows the 




Fig. 5.  Graph of the execution time for a set of studies (left) and (right) 
registering and retrieving objects with and without encryption. 
 
In figure 5 (left), four different series of experimental values 
are represented. On one hand, “crypt-up” and “crypt-down” 
show the time used for registering and retrieving objects, 
including encrypting and decrypting the object and key 
sharing. On the other hand, “up” and “down” show the time 
used for registering and retrieving objects without encryption. 
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Each point in the graph represents the average time measured 
by the client clock. The error bars shown in the graph show the 
standard error calculated for each data point. 
Figure 5 (right) shows the difference D, calculated as: 
D = time with encryption - time without encryption 
The importance of this graph is to show that even when the 
difference with and without encryption tends to be greater for 
large-sized objects, it is possible to estimate a performance 
level in a given interval. For example, the results of this study 
show that for those objects in the interval from 0.5 to 7.7 MB, 
it is possible to anticipate up to 4 additional seconds for 
retrieving an object using encryption, if compared with the 
same process without using encryption. This is consistent with 
the initial studies demonstrating that the overhead due to the 
security model can be accepted even in an interactive use.  
Grouping several key shares for different objects in a single 
request is also possible, so the overhead for retrieving the 
decryption keys could be optimized when several objects are 
used in the same study. This is a common need in medical 
research and training, the main two objectives of the system. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Healthgrids require supporting the flow of information 
across hospital network boundaries. Encrypted storage is 
needed to ensure data privacy on different administrative 
domains. Sharing encrypted objects requires an infrastructure 
to manage, protect and control access to the encryption keys. 
However, decryption keys have a lifecycle, whose 
management is proposed in this paper by ontology-organized 
key management for long-term storage. 
The novelty of the approach is to bind automatically the 
authorisation of users to the actual data automatically through 
the use of ontologies that specify the data accessible and the 
relation of VO groups and those ontologies, instead of using 
the classical ACL approach. Other novelty is in the definition 
of a distributed security enforcement scheme that takes 
advantage of the ontologies for distributing and managing the 
encryption keys in a secure manner. DICOM fields (headers or 
DICOM-SR tags) used to build the ontologies are previously 
anonymized, guaranteeing that almost all fields can be used, 
and resulting in a comprehensive set of ontologies. 
The information-centric approach of securing the data 
combined with protecting and controlling the access to the 
decryption keys presented in this paper, have proven to be 
effective in the prevention of incidents of exposed data due to 
inconsistent encryption and key management policies, in the 
prevention of incidents of inaccessible data due to 
mismanagement of decryption keys, and in helping 
communities to increase the consistency of encryption and key 
management policies across organization boundaries. 
In addition, this work contributes to increasing the clarity of 
responsibilities and also contributes to the creation of 
encryption and key management policies and practices. 
Overhead due to encryption and decryption is not significant 
with respect to data transfer overhead, and those processes are 
performed on the client-side to improve scalability. The 
ontologies are connected to objects both through the IOS and 
the Key Server. Duplicating this layer of access control could 
penalize performance when propagating changes in the 
ontologies, but deliver higher scalability when the ontologies 
association do not change in time often. Ontology updates are 
performed in a lazy revocation. When the ontologies change, a 
new object with a new EOUID is created, reducing the need 
for massive re-encryption. This update management could be 
inefficient for objects frequently changing their ontological 
classification, medical imaging Grids normally deal with read-
only and persistent data which minimises this issue. 
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